The deterrence of crime and its reduction through incapacitation are studied in a simple multiperiod model of crime and law enforcement. Optimal imprisonment sanctions and the optimal probability of sanctions are determined. A point of emphasis is that the incapacitation of individuals is often socially desirable even when they are potentially deterrable. The reason is that successful deterrence may require a relatively high probability of sanctions and thus a relatively high enforcement expense. In contrast, incapacitation may yield benefits no matter how low the probability of sanctions is-implying that incapacitation may be superior to deterrence.
Introduction
The deterrence of crime-its discouragement by means of the threat of imprisonmentand the reduction of crime through incapacitation-its direct prevention as a result of actual imprisonment-are two primary purposes of imprisonment. In order to study incapacitation along with deterrence, I examine a setting in which individuals make decisions over time whether to commit crimes. Under that assumption, a person who is not deterred from committing a crime and is caught and imprisoned would be prevented from committing other crimes when he is in prison. This outcome could yield an incapacitation benefit, for the person might have decided to commit further crimes had he not been in prison. 1 In particular, I consider in Section 2 a simple model involving decision making over time about crime, namely, a model in which individuals live two periods and make decisions each period whether to commit crimes (which are presumed to be socially undesirable acts) in the face of the threat of imprisonment sanctions. Individuals might be potentially deterrable-possible to deter employing a feasible sanction and a probability of its imposition-or undeterrableimpossible to deter.
I initially determine the optimal choice of imprisonment sanctions, taking the probability of sanctions as given. The conclusions are straightforward. First, it is best to employ sanctions that are sufficient to deter whenever deterrence is achievable given the probability of sanctions.
Whether deterrence is achievable depends in part on an incapacitative enhancement to deterrence: when a person is imprisoned, he forgoes the gains he would obtain from crimes he would otherwise commit-which serves to deter, along with the disutility of imprisonment.
Second, if deterrence is not achievable given the probability of sanctions, it may still be desirable to employ sanctions in order to incapacitate. The condition under which incapacitation is advantageous is that the cost of imprisonment is less than the incapacitation benefit. This benefit is the net social harm from the crimes the person would commit if he were not in prison (which is endogenous to the model, as the crimes he would commit if he were not in prison will depend on deterrence).
I then find the optimal probability of sanctions. Increasing the probability augments deterrence when that is possible, and it also results in greater incapacitation benefits when such benefits exist (because more individuals who are worth incapacitating are caught). However, raising the probability involves additional costs of enforcement. At the optimal probability of sanctions, potentially deterrable individuals might or might not be deterred, and in the latter case it might be desirable to incapacitate them. outcome is that, on one hand, it can be expensive, and thus uneconomic, for society to invest enough in enforcement resources to achieve deterrence. (To deter many types of crime, a very high probability of sanctions might be needed.) Yet, on the other hand, it can still be worthwhile for society to invest a lower amount to capture and imprison individuals for the purpose of incapacitation-even though these individuals could have been deterred if the probability of sanctions had been higher. In other words, one may view the use of prison to incapacitate as a rational economic choice reflecting a social desire to save the enforcement resources that would be needed to deter.
In Section 3, I comment on the conclusions from the model. Before proceeding, let me note that the economic literature on the theory of crime and imprisonment has focused on deterrence, usually to the exclusion of incapacitation. the optimal probability of sanctions; 4 and Shavell (1987a) determines the optimal length and probability of imprisonment, but in a model of pure incapacitation.
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This article appears to be the first to analyze both the optimal length and the optimal probability of imprisonment in a model involving deterrence and incapacitation. Its main contribution is the point that society may find incapacitation an advantageous policy not merely for incorrigible individuals, but also for potentially deterrable individuals-essentially because the policy of incapacitation allows society to conserve on enforcement resources and still to achieve useful prevention of crime.
The Model
Time in the model is divided into periods. In each period, a cohort of identical individuals of size 1 enters the population and lives for two periods. Thus, the population in each period consists of a young cohort that just entered and an old cohort that entered the previous period.
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The total population is 2 each period.
At the beginning of every period, each person chooses whether to commit a harmful act, called a crime, unless he is in prison at the beginning of the period (a possibility to be described).
If a person commits a crime, he obtains a benefit b > 0 and causes a harm h > 0, where b < h. This latter assumption is made in order that the acts called crimes are socially undesirable (the social objective is defined below).
A person who commits a crime in a period might be caught and suffer a sanction of imprisonment, which will begin in the period of the crime. If an individual is not caught for committing a crime in the first period of his life, he will not be caught in the second period for his crime in the earlier period. Also, individuals who decide not to commit a crime in a period are never mistakenly caught and sanctioned.
The sanction of imprisonment is a discrete number of periods. The sanction for a young person, denoted s 1 , can be 0, 1, or 2 periods; if the sanction is 1 period, it is suffered over the first period of the person's life, and if the sanction is 2 periods, it is suffered over both periods of his life. The sanction for an old person, denoted s 2 , can be 0 or 1. is potentially deterrable because it will be seen to be possible to deter him from committing the crime in both periods if the probability of sanctions is sufficiently high. This assumption will be my focus because my chief object is to investigate deterrence together with incapacitation.
However, I will also consider the case in which b > 2d, which I will refer to as that in which a person is undeterrable because it will be seen to be impossible to deter him from committing the crime in either period regardless of the probability of sanctions. Finally, consider a young person and suppose that s 1 = 2, life imprisonment. In this case, if he commits a crime, his payoff will be
The reason is that if he is caught and put in prison for both periods of his life, he will not obtain v, whereas if he is not caught, which occurs with probability 1 -p, he will obtain v. And, again, if a young person does not commit a crime, he will obtain v. Hence, the young person will
In other words, the effective sanction when s 1 is 2 is the disutility 2d from two periods of imprisonment plus the loss v of what he would have been enjoyed in period 2 had he been free at the beginning of that period. Notably, if s 2 is 0, we know that an old person would commit a crime and obtain b if free at the beginning of the period 2. Hence, in this case, v is b, so that (4) would become b > p(2d + b); the effective sanction would include the benefit b from crime that would be forgone due to incapacitation, so that deterrence would involve what was referred to in the introduction as an incapacitative enhancement. Another possibility is that s 2 is 1 and b ≤ pd, so that the old person would be deterred from committing a crime. In this case, v is 0, meaning that (4) would reduce to b > p2d, and there would be no incapacitative enhancement to deterrence.
Incapacitation can come about in this model only when a person is in prison at the beginning of a period-for that is when he would decide to commit a crime if he were free.
Hence, incapacitation can come about only in period 2 of a person's life, and only as a result of the imposition of a two period sanction when he was young. The social benefit from incapacitation in period 2 of a person's life is as follows. If s 2 is 0, so that he would have committed the crime and not been sanctioned when old, he would have generated social losses of h -b; thus the benefit from incapacitation in that period would be h -b. If s 2 is 1 and he would have been deterred from committing the crime, then he would have generated no social losses, so the incapacitation benefit would be zero. And if s 2 is 1 and he would not have been deterred from committing the crime, he would have generated social losses of h -b + p(d + k), so that would have been the incapacitation benefit. This shows how the incapacitation benefit depends on possible sanctions and on possible deterrence in period 2 of a person's life. I will refer below
as the incapacitation condition. On the left is the social cost of imprisonment for two periods;
and on the right is the social benefit from incapacitation in period 2 when, in that period, the individual would have committed a crime and the sanction for doing so would have been zero.
Having described the determination of the behavior of individuals given the sanctions s i
and p, and how incapacitation arises, I can now ascertain the optimal s i and p. I will denote the optimal sanctions as a function of p as s 1 *(p) and s 2 *(p) and the optimal p as p*. We first have Proposition 1. Assume that individuals are potentially deterrable. Then optimal sanctions s 1 *(p) for the young and s 2 *(p) for the old, conditional on the probability p of sanctions, and the outcomes under these optimal sanctions, are as follows. 
Proof. See the Appendix.
Notes. (a) In region C, p is sufficiently high that it is possible to deter everyone. Hence, it must be optimal to choose sanctions to accomplish complete deterrence, for that will mean that social costs, apart from c(p), will be zero.
(b) In region B, p is insufficient to deter the old but is sufficient to deter the young. The reason that the young can be deterred but the old cannot is that for the young, a life sentence is 2 periods, whereas for the old, it is only 1 period. Accordingly, it is optimal to choose sanctions to deter the young but not to impose sanctions on the old. Note that there can be no incapacitation in region B because the only way incapacitation can arise is through use of a sanction of 2 that fails to deter. But if a sanction of 2 is used, deterrence will be successful.
(c) In region A, p is insufficient to deter anyone. Hence, the only reason that it could be beneficial to impose sanctions is to accomplish incapacitation. Imprisoning an old person for a crime committed in period 2 of his life cannot accomplish incapacitation, for there is no future time during which he could commit a crime. Hence, it is only the young for whom a sanction could accomplish incapacitation, and that would be true only if the sanction is 2. The total social cost of a sanction of 2 is 2(d + k), and the social benefit is h -b, since we know that in period 2 an old person would commit a crime and would not be sanctioned. Hence, incapacitation will be condition and the use of imprisonment in region A becomes less likely. As h increases, there is no effect on deterrence or on the regions A, B, and C. However, satisfaction of the incapacitation condition becomes more likely. Finally, as k increases, there is no effect on deterrence or on the regions A, B, and C, but satisfaction of the incapacitation condition becomes less likely.
With regard to undeterrable individuals, the conclusion is as follows. 
Note. Because individuals are not deterrable, it is clear that p cannot influence the optimal sanctions and that only the incapacitation condition can be relevant to them. Now that I have examined the optimal sanctions s i as a function of p, I can determine p*, the optimal p. For potentially deterrables, I will need to refer to p A *, which is defined to be the optimal p (or an optimal p if not unique) within region A = [0, b/(2d + b)) when the incapacitation condition holds, provided that p A * exists.
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We have Proposition 3. Assume that individuals are potentially deterrable. Then the optimal probability p* and the optimal outcomes under the optimal sanctions are as follows. 10 For expositional convenience, I will not discuss the possibility here and below that p* is not unique. Proof. See the Appendix.
particular, let min = min(c(p
Notes. (a) When the incapacitation condition does not hold, we know from Proposition 1 that incapacitation cannot be optimal, so that the optimal probability is determined entirely by considerations of deterrence. Specifically, there are only two positive probabilities that need to be examined: b/d, the minimum probability that will deter all individuals, and b/(2d + b), the minimum probability that will deter the young but not the old. The optimal probability will be positive and one of these two if the cost of raising p to either level is less than the resulting reduction in social harm accomplished by deterrence.
(b) When the incapacitation condition holds, we know that if p is in region A, where no one is deterred, incapacitation will be valuable, and social costs will be c(p) (e) With regard to the effect of changes in the parameters on p* and optimal outcomes, consider first h.
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If h is sufficiently close to its lower bound b, then p* is 0.
14 The reason is that in the neighborhood of b, the social harm from crime is negligible. If h is sufficiently high, in
The rationale is that as the social harm from crime grows, it must become worthwhile to achieve complete deterrence.
If b is sufficiently close to 0, p* will equal b/d and complete deterrence will be optimal.
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The reason is that the probability of sanctions needed to achieve complete deterrence, and thus 
20
The rationale is that as the disutility from punishment grows, the probability needed to achieve complete deterrence tends toward 0, so it must become worthwhile to achieve complete deterrence.
As k approaches its lower bound, zero, no conclusions can be drawn about p*.
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If k is sufficiently high, the incapacitation condition will not hold, so that solution cannot involve incapacitation, but no conclusions can be drawn about p*.
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With regard to undeterrable individuals, we have Proposition 4. Assume that individuals are undeterrable. Then the optimal probability p* and the optimal outcomes under the optimal sanctions are as follows. Proof. See the Appendix.
Notes. It clearly can be optimal to employ a positive probability only if the incapacitation condition holds, in which case it is optimal to sanction the young in order to incapacitate them. In that case, if the optimal probability is interior, it will be determined by the first-order condition that the marginal cost of raising p equals the marginal incapacitation benefit,
Comments
Several possible extensions of the model are worth noting. One is to allow for variations in the benefits that individuals obtain from crime, the harm caused by it, and the disutility of sanctions. Under the assumption that the state can observe these variables, the conclusions would be similar to those found above. In particular, if a person of a given type could be deterred given the probability of sanctions, the sanction would be chosen to accomplish that objective; otherwise, the person would be imprisoned if and only if the benefits from incapacitation would outweigh the costs. Furthermore, the optimal probability of sanctions would reflect the same tradeoffs as were discussed, involving the cost of raising the probability, the advantage of achieving greater deterrence and incapacitation as a consequence, and also the fact that it may be desirable to employ a low probability to save enforcement resources because incapacitation can still usefully prevent crime.
A second extension is to consider the model just sketched with different types of individuals, but to assume that the state's information about an individual's benefits from crime and the disutility he would experience from sanctions is imperfect. Then the use of sanctions to deter would sometimes fail to achieve that result and lead to the actual imprisonment of individuals.
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As a consequence, imprisonment would often occur even though it would not be justified by incapacitation.
A third extension is to permit a longer life than two periods and also benefits and harm from crime that decline with age. Among other things, this would lead to the optimality of limited periods of imprisonment for the purposes of incapacitation and also to the possibility of recidivism.
young persons commit crimes, implying that social costs are again at least c(p)
Since these costs exceed c(p) + (h -b), policies with s 2 = 1 cannot be optimal.
(c) For any p in region A, we know from (2) that it is not possible to deter old individuals.
Furthermore, it is also impossible to deter the young. In particular, we know from (4) that In addition, we know from above that if s 1 is 0, the young will commit crimes when (1) holds, and that if s 1 is 1, they will commit crimes if (2) holds. Hence, the young will definitely commit crimes.
To compute social welfare under the different possible sanctioning regimes is now simple because we know that no one will be deterred. 
